> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://cortex-docs.paloaltonetworks.com/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://cortex-docs.paloaltonetworks.com/analytics-alerts/alerts-by-name/a-process-connected-to-a-rare-external-host.md).

# A process connected to a rare external host

### Synopsis

| Field                | Value                              |
| -------------------- | ---------------------------------- |
| Activation Period    | 14 Days                            |
| Training Period      | 30 Days                            |
| Test Period          | N/A (single event)                 |
| Deduplication Period | 1 Day                              |
| Required Data        | XDR Agent                          |
| ATT\&CK Tactic       | Command and Control (TA0011)       |
| ATT\&CK Technique    | Application Layer Protocol (T1071) |
| Severity             | Informational                      |

### Description

A process connected to an external host name or directly to an IP address, which is rarely connected to from the organization.

### Attacker's Goals

Beacon to C2 server and/or exfiltrate data.

### Investigative actions

Check whether the process was injected or otherwise subverted for malicious use.

### Variations

<details>

<summary>MSBuild process connected to a rare external host</summary>

**Synopsis**

| Field             | Value                                                                                                |
| ----------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic    | Stealth (TA0005), Command and Control (TA0011)                                                       |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution: MSBuild (T1127.001), Application Layer Protocol (T1071) |
| Severity          | High                                                                                                 |

**Description**

MSBuild normally does not make any network connections. This unusual activity may be malicious since attackers can leverage MSBuild for code execution.

**Attacker's Goals**

Beacon to C2 server and/or exfiltrate data.

**Investigative actions**

Check if CGO actor process is not code developing tool (IDE) and whether the actor process subverted for malicious use.

</details>

<details>

<summary>MSBuild process connected to a rare external host</summary>

**Synopsis**

| Field             | Value                                                            |
| ----------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic    | Stealth (TA0005)                                                 |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution: MSBuild (T1127.001) |
| Severity          | Medium                                                           |

**Description**

MSBuild normally does not make any network connections. This unusual activity may be malicious since attackers can leverage MSBuild for code execution.

**Attacker's Goals**

Beacon to C2 server and/or exfiltrate data.

**Investigative actions**

Check if CGO actor process is not code developing tool (IDE) and whether the actor process subverted for malicious use.

</details>

<details>

<summary>LOLBIN spawned by an Office executable connected to a rare external host</summary>

**Synopsis**

| Field             | Value                              |
| ----------------- | ---------------------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic    | Command and Control (TA0011)       |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Application Layer Protocol (T1071) |
| Severity          | High                               |

**Description**

A LOLBIN run by an Office process connected to an external IP address or host, which is rarely connected to from the organization.

**Attacker's Goals**

Beacon to C2 server and/or exfiltrate data.

**Investigative actions**

Check whether the process was injected or otherwise subverted for malicious use.

</details>

<details>

<summary>A curl process connected to a rare external host</summary>

**Synopsis**

| Field             | Value                              |
| ----------------- | ---------------------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic    | Command and Control (TA0011)       |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Application Layer Protocol (T1071) |
| Severity          | Informational                      |

**Description**

A process connected to an external host name or directly to an IP address, which is rarely connected to from the organization.

**Attacker's Goals**

Beacon to C2 server and/or exfiltrate data.

**Investigative actions**

Check whether the process was injected or otherwise subverted for malicious use.

</details>

<details>

<summary>VSCode extension process connected to a rare external host</summary>

**Synopsis**

| Field             | Value                              |
| ----------------- | ---------------------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic    | Command and Control (TA0011)       |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Application Layer Protocol (T1071) |
| Severity          | Low                                |

**Description**

A VSCode extension connected to an external IP address or host, which is rarely connected to from the organization.

**Attacker's Goals**

Beacon to C2 server and/or exfiltrate data.

**Investigative actions**

Check whether the process was injected or otherwise subverted for malicious use.

</details>

<details>

<summary>UNIX LOLBIN process connected to a rare external host</summary>

**Synopsis**

| Field             | Value                              |
| ----------------- | ---------------------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic    | Command and Control (TA0011)       |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Application Layer Protocol (T1071) |
| Severity          | Low                                |

**Description**

A UNIX LOLBIN connected to an external IP address or host, which is rarely connected to from the organization.

**Attacker's Goals**

Beacon to C2 server and/or exfiltrate data.

**Investigative actions**

Check whether the process was injected or otherwise subverted for malicious use.

</details>


---

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