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An uncommon RDP session from a managed host

Synopsis

Field
Value

Activation Period

14 Days

Training Period

30 Days

Test Period

N/A (single event)

Deduplication Period

1 Day

Required Data

XDR Agent

Detector Tags

Enhanced RDP Analytics

ATT&CK Tactic

Lateral Movement (TA0008)

ATT&CK Technique

Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol (T1021.001)

Severity

Informational

Description

An RDP session was established with uncommon parameters from a managed host.

Attacker's Goals

Adversaries may use RDP for initial access or lateral movement within a network.

Investigative actions

  • Investigate the source and destination of the RDP communication.

  • Check if this communication is legitimate and expected.

  • Analyze the user and process that initiated the RDP connection.

Variations

An uncommon RDP session initiated by a chained RDP client

Synopsis

Field
Value

ATT&CK Tactic

Lateral Movement (TA0008)

ATT&CK Technique

Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol (T1021.001)

Severity

Low

Description

An RDP session was established by a process that is itself an RDP client, which is uncommon behavior.

Attacker's Goals

Adversaries may use RDP for initial access or lateral movement within a network.

Investigative actions

  • Investigate the source and destination of the RDP communication.

  • Check if this communication is legitimate and expected.

  • Analyze the user and process that initiated the RDP connection.

An uncommon RDP session initiated by a globally rare RDP client

Synopsis

Field
Value

ATT&CK Tactic

Lateral Movement (TA0008)

ATT&CK Technique

Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol (T1021.001)

Severity

Low

Description

An RDP session was established by a process hash that has not been seen globally, which is uncommon.

Attacker's Goals

Adversaries may use RDP for initial access or lateral movement within a network.

Investigative actions

  • Investigate the source and destination of the RDP communication.

  • Check if this communication is legitimate and expected.

  • Analyze the user and process that initiated the RDP connection.

An uncommon RDP session initiated by a rare RDP client

Synopsis

Field
Value

ATT&CK Tactic

Lateral Movement (TA0008)

ATT&CK Technique

Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol (T1021.001)

Severity

Low

Description

An RDP session was established by a process hash that is rare in the environment.

Attacker's Goals

Adversaries may use RDP for initial access or lateral movement within a network.

Investigative actions

  • Investigate the source and destination of the RDP communication.

  • Check if this communication is legitimate and expected.

  • Analyze the user and process that initiated the RDP connection.

An uncommon RDP session from a host that rarely initiates RDP

Synopsis

Field
Value

ATT&CK Tactic

Lateral Movement (TA0008)

ATT&CK Technique

Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol (T1021.001)

Severity

Low

Description

An RDP session was initiated from a host that does not typically establish RDP connections.

Attacker's Goals

Adversaries may use RDP for initial access or lateral movement within a network.

Investigative actions

  • Investigate the source and destination of the RDP communication.

  • Check if this communication is legitimate and expected.

  • Analyze the user and process that initiated the RDP connection.

An uncommon RDP session initiated by a process with rare causality

Synopsis

Field
Value

ATT&CK Tactic

Lateral Movement (TA0008)

ATT&CK Technique

Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol (T1021.001)

Severity

Low

Description

An RDP session was established by a process with an uncommon parent process relationship.

Attacker's Goals

Adversaries may use RDP for initial access or lateral movement within a network.

Investigative actions

  • Investigate the source and destination of the RDP communication.

  • Check if this communication is legitimate and expected.

  • Analyze the user and process that initiated the RDP connection.

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