> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://cortex-docs.paloaltonetworks.com/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://cortex-docs.paloaltonetworks.com/analytics-alerts/alerts-by-name/first-seen-resent-from-address-in-the-organization.md).

# First seen Resent-From address in the organization

### Synopsis

| Field                | Value                   |
| -------------------- | ----------------------- |
| Activation Period    | 14 Days                 |
| Training Period      | 30 Days                 |
| Test Period          | N/A (single event)      |
| Deduplication Period | 1 Hour 30 Minutes       |
| Required Data        | Microsoft 365 Emails    |
| Detection Modules    | Email                   |
| ATT\&CK Tactic       | Initial Access (TA0001) |
| ATT\&CK Technique    | Phishing (T1566)        |
| Severity             | Informational           |

### Description

An email was received with a Resent-From address that has not been observed in the organization in the last 30 days. Since the Resend mechanism should be constant and repetitive, a first-seen Resent-From address may indicate early phases of an attack, or a new user that configures a forwarding rule (by resent headers) to his organization's mailbox.

### Attacker's Goals

Leverage the resend mechanism to bypass email security controls

* Deliver phishing or malicious payloads through a seemingly legitimate email forwarding chain
* Compromise internal accounts and use them to resend malicious content.

### Investigative actions

* Verify whether the Resent-From address is known and legitimate within the organization.
* Check if the Resent-From address belongs to a public email provider, which may indicate an external threat.
* Review the email content for suspicious links, attachments, or social engineering attempts.
* Investigate the original sender and the full email chain for signs of tampering.

### Variations

<details>

<summary>First-seen Resent-From address from a public email provider</summary>

**Synopsis**

| Field             | Value                   |
| ----------------- | ----------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic    | Initial Access (TA0001) |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Phishing (T1566)        |
| Severity          | Low                     |

**Description**

An email was received with a Resent-From address that has not been observed in the organization in the last 30 days. Since the Resend mechanism should be constant and repetitive, a first-seen Resent-From address may indicate early phases of an attack, or a new user that configures a forwarding rule (by resent headers) to his organization's mailbox.

**Attacker's Goals**

Leverage the resend mechanism to bypass email security controls

* Deliver phishing or malicious payloads through a seemingly legitimate email forwarding chain
* Compromise internal accounts and use them to resend malicious content.

**Investigative actions**

* Verify whether the Resent-From address is known and legitimate within the organization.
* Check if the Resent-From address belongs to a public email provider, which may indicate an external threat.
* Review the email content for suspicious links, attachments, or social engineering attempts.
* Investigate the original sender and the full email chain for signs of tampering.

</details>

<details>

<summary>First-seen Resent-From internal address in the organization</summary>

**Synopsis**

| Field             | Value                   |
| ----------------- | ----------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic    | Initial Access (TA0001) |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Phishing (T1566)        |
| Severity          | Low                     |

**Description**

An email was received with a Resent-From address that has not been observed in the organization in the last 30 days. Since the Resend mechanism should be constant and repetitive, a first-seen Resent-From address may indicate early phases of an attack, or a new user that configures a forwarding rule (by resent headers) to his organization's mailbox.

**Attacker's Goals**

Leverage the resend mechanism to bypass email security controls

* Deliver phishing or malicious payloads through a seemingly legitimate email forwarding chain
* Compromise internal accounts and use them to resend malicious content.

**Investigative actions**

* Verify whether the Resent-From address is known and legitimate within the organization.
* Check if the Resent-From address belongs to a public email provider, which may indicate an external threat.
* Review the email content for suspicious links, attachments, or social engineering attempts.
* Investigate the original sender and the full email chain for signs of tampering.

</details>

<details>

<summary>First-seen Resent-From distribution list in the organization</summary>

**Synopsis**

| Field             | Value                   |
| ----------------- | ----------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic    | Initial Access (TA0001) |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Phishing (T1566)        |
| Severity          | Low                     |

**Description**

An email was received with a Resent-From address that has not been observed in the organization in the last 30 days. Since the Resend mechanism should be constant and repetitive, a first-seen Resent-From address may indicate early phases of an attack, or a new user that configures a forwarding rule (by resent headers) to his organization's mailbox.

**Attacker's Goals**

Leverage the resend mechanism to bypass email security controls

* Deliver phishing or malicious payloads through a seemingly legitimate email forwarding chain
* Compromise internal accounts and use them to resend malicious content.

**Investigative actions**

* Verify whether the Resent-From address is known and legitimate within the organization.
* Check if the Resent-From address belongs to a public email provider, which may indicate an external threat.
* Review the email content for suspicious links, attachments, or social engineering attempts.
* Investigate the original sender and the full email chain for signs of tampering.

</details>


---

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