> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://cortex-docs.paloaltonetworks.com/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://cortex-docs.paloaltonetworks.com/analytics-alerts/alerts-by-name/globally-uncommon-image-load-from-a-signed-process.md).

# Globally uncommon image load from a signed process

### Synopsis

| Field                | Value                                                                         |
| -------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Activation Period    | 14 Days                                                                       |
| Training Period      | 30 Days                                                                       |
| Test Period          | N/A (single event)                                                            |
| Deduplication Period | 1 Day                                                                         |
| Required Data        | XDR Agent                                                                     |
| Detector Tags        | Global Anomaly Analytics, DLL Hijacking Analytics                             |
| ATT\&CK Tactic       | Stealth (TA0005)                                                              |
| ATT\&CK Technique    | System Binary Proxy Execution (T1218), Hijack Execution Flow: DLL (T1574.001) |
| Severity             | Informational                                                                 |

### Description

A signed process loaded a DLL that, on a global level, it usually doesn't load.

### Attacker's Goals

Attackers may use various methods to execute code in the context of a signed process to avoid detection.

### Investigative actions

* Check if the actor process loaded a suspicious DLL before the alert.
* Check if the actor process was injected before the alert.
* Check if the process execution and connections are legitimate.

### Variations

<details>

<summary>Globally uncommon image load from a signed process from a known vendor</summary>

**Synopsis**

| Field             | Value                                                                         |
| ----------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic    | Stealth (TA0005)                                                              |
| ATT\&CK Technique | System Binary Proxy Execution (T1218), Hijack Execution Flow: DLL (T1574.001) |
| Severity          | Medium                                                                        |

**Description**

A signed process loaded a DLL that, on a global level, it usually doesn't load.

**Attacker's Goals**

Attackers may use various methods to execute code in the context of a signed process to avoid detection.

**Investigative actions**

* Check if the actor process loaded a suspicious DLL before the alert.
* Check if the actor process was injected before the alert.
* Check if the process execution and connections are legitimate.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Globally uncommon unsigned image side loaded to a signed process</summary>

**Synopsis**

| Field             | Value                                                                         |
| ----------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic    | Stealth (TA0005)                                                              |
| ATT\&CK Technique | System Binary Proxy Execution (T1218), Hijack Execution Flow: DLL (T1574.001) |
| Severity          | Medium                                                                        |

**Description**

A signed process side loaded an unsigned DLL that, on a global level, it usually doesn't load.

**Attacker's Goals**

Attackers may use various methods to execute code in the context of a signed process to avoid detection.

**Investigative actions**

* Check if the actor process loaded a suspicious DLL before the alert.
* Check if the actor process was injected before the alert.
* Check if the process execution and connections are legitimate.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Globally uncommon and very rare image load from a signed process</summary>

**Synopsis**

| Field             | Value                                                                         |
| ----------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic    | Stealth (TA0005)                                                              |
| ATT\&CK Technique | System Binary Proxy Execution (T1218), Hijack Execution Flow: DLL (T1574.001) |
| Severity          | Medium                                                                        |

**Description**

A signed process loaded a DLL that, on a global level, it usually doesn't load.

**Attacker's Goals**

Attackers may use various methods to execute code in the context of a signed process to avoid detection.

**Investigative actions**

* Check if the actor process loaded a suspicious DLL before the alert.
* Check if the actor process was injected before the alert.
* Check if the process execution and connections are legitimate.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Globally uncommon image load from an injected thread in a signed process</summary>

**Synopsis**

| Field             | Value                                                                                                    |
| ----------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic    | Stealth (TA0005)                                                                                         |
| ATT\&CK Technique | System Binary Proxy Execution (T1218), Hijack Execution Flow: DLL (T1574.001), Process Injection (T1055) |
| Severity          | Low                                                                                                      |

**Description**

An injected thread in a signed process loaded a DLL that, on a global level, it usually doesn't load.

**Attacker's Goals**

Attackers may use various methods to execute code in the context of a signed process to avoid detection.

**Investigative actions**

* Check if the actor process loaded a suspicious DLL before the alert.
* Check if the actor process was injected before the alert.
* Check if the process execution and connections are legitimate.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Globally uncommon DLL was downloaded from an uncommon source and loaded by a signed process</summary>

**Synopsis**

| Field             | Value                                                                         |
| ----------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic    | Stealth (TA0005)                                                              |
| ATT\&CK Technique | System Binary Proxy Execution (T1218), Hijack Execution Flow: DLL (T1574.001) |
| Severity          | Low                                                                           |

**Description**

A signed process loaded a DLL that, on a global level, it usually doesn't load.

**Attacker's Goals**

Attackers may use various methods to execute code in the context of a signed process to avoid detection.

**Investigative actions**

* Check if the actor process loaded a suspicious DLL before the alert.
* Check if the actor process was injected before the alert.
* Check if the process execution and connections are legitimate.

</details>


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