> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://cortex-docs.paloaltonetworks.com/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://cortex-docs.paloaltonetworks.com/analytics-alerts/alerts-by-name/globally-uncommon-process-execution-from-a-signed-process.md).

# Globally uncommon process execution from a signed process

### Synopsis

| Field                | Value                    |
| -------------------- | ------------------------ |
| Activation Period    | 14 Days                  |
| Training Period      | 30 Days                  |
| Test Period          | N/A (single event)       |
| Deduplication Period | 1 Day                    |
| Required Data        | XDR Agent                |
| Detector Tags        | Global Anomaly Analytics |
| ATT\&CK Tactic       | Execution (TA0002)       |
| ATT\&CK Technique    | User Execution (T1204)   |
| Severity             | Informational            |

### Description

A signed process has executed a process that, on a global level, it usually doesn't execute.

### Attacker's Goals

Unusual processes may be executed for various purposes, including exfiltration, lateral movement, etc.

### Investigative actions

* Check if the actor process was injected or loaded a suspicious DLL before the alert.
* Check if the process execution and connections are legitimate.

### Variations

<details>

<summary>Globally uncommon process execution from a signed process from a known vendor</summary>

**Synopsis**

| Field             | Value                  |
| ----------------- | ---------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic    | Execution (TA0002)     |
| ATT\&CK Technique | User Execution (T1204) |
| Severity          | Medium                 |

**Description**

A signed process has executed a process that, on a global level, it usually doesn't execute.

**Attacker's Goals**

Unusual processes may be executed for various purposes, including exfiltration, lateral movement, etc.

**Investigative actions**

* Check if the actor process was injected or loaded a suspicious DLL before the alert.
* Check if the process execution and connections are legitimate.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Globally rare process execution from a signed process</summary>

**Synopsis**

| Field             | Value                  |
| ----------------- | ---------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic    | Execution (TA0002)     |
| ATT\&CK Technique | User Execution (T1204) |
| Severity          | Medium                 |

**Description**

A signed process has executed a process that, on a global level, it usually doesn't execute.

**Attacker's Goals**

Unusual processes may be executed for various purposes, including exfiltration, lateral movement, etc.

**Investigative actions**

* Check if the actor process was injected or loaded a suspicious DLL before the alert.
* Check if the process execution and connections are legitimate.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Globally uncommon process execution from an injected thread in a signed process</summary>

**Synopsis**

| Field             | Value                                             |
| ----------------- | ------------------------------------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic    | Execution (TA0002), Stealth (TA0005)              |
| ATT\&CK Technique | User Execution (T1204), Process Injection (T1055) |
| Severity          | Low                                               |

**Description**

An injected thread in a signed process has executed a process that, on a global level, it usually doesn't execute.

**Attacker's Goals**

Unusual processes may be executed for various purposes, including exfiltration, lateral movement, etc.

**Investigative actions**

* Check if the actor process was injected or loaded a suspicious DLL before the alert.
* Check if the process execution and connections are legitimate.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Globally uncommon process execution from a web server process or CGO</summary>

**Synopsis**

| Field             | Value                                                                                                      |
| ----------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic    | Execution (TA0002), Initial Access (TA0001), Persistence (TA0003)                                          |
| ATT\&CK Technique | User Execution (T1204), External Remote Services (T1133), Server Software Component: Web Shell (T1505.003) |
| Severity          | Low                                                                                                        |

**Description**

A web server process or CGO has executed a process that, on a global level, it usually doesn't execute.

**Attacker's Goals**

Unusual processes may be executed for various purposes, including exfiltration, lateral movement, etc.

**Investigative actions**

* Check if the actor process was injected or loaded a suspicious DLL before the alert.
* Check if the process execution and connections are legitimate.

</details>


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