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Globally uncommon root domain from a signed process

Synopsis

Field
Value

Activation Period

14 Days

Training Period

30 Days

Test Period

N/A (single event)

Deduplication Period

1 Day

Required Data

XDR Agent

Detector Tags

Global Anomaly Analytics

ATT&CK Tactic

Stealth (TA0005), Command and Control (TA0011)

ATT&CK Technique

System Binary Proxy Execution (T1218), Application Layer Protocol (T1071)

Severity

Low

Description

A signed process connected to an external domain that, on a global level, it usually doesn't connect to.

Attacker's Goals

Attackers may use various methods to execute code in the context of a signed process to avoid detection.

Investigative actions

  • Check the destination domain reputation.

  • Check if the actor process loaded a suspicious dll before the alert.

  • Check if the actor process was injected before the alert.

  • Check if the process execution and connections are legitimate.

Variations

Globally uncommon root domain from an injected thread in a signed process

Synopsis

Field
Value

ATT&CK Tactic

Stealth (TA0005), Command and Control (TA0011)

ATT&CK Technique

System Binary Proxy Execution (T1218), Application Layer Protocol (T1071), Process Injection (T1055)

Severity

High

Description

An injected thread in a signed process connected to an external domain that, on a global level, it usually doesn't connect to.

Attacker's Goals

Attackers may use various methods to execute code in the context of a signed process to avoid detection.

Investigative actions

  • Check the destination domain reputation.

  • Check if the actor process loaded a suspicious dll before the alert.

  • Check if the actor process was injected before the alert.

  • Check if the process execution and connections are legitimate.

Globally uncommon root domain from a signed process

Synopsis

Field
Value

ATT&CK Tactic

Stealth (TA0005), Command and Control (TA0011)

ATT&CK Technique

System Binary Proxy Execution (T1218), Application Layer Protocol (T1071)

Severity

High

Description

A signed process connected to an external domain that, on a global level, it usually doesn't connect to.

Attacker's Goals

Attackers may use various methods to execute code in the context of a signed process to avoid detection.

Investigative actions

  • Check the destination domain reputation.

  • Check if the actor process loaded a suspicious dll before the alert.

  • Check if the actor process was injected before the alert.

  • Check if the process execution and connections are legitimate.

Globally uncommon root domain from a signed process

Synopsis

Field
Value

ATT&CK Tactic

Stealth (TA0005), Command and Control (TA0011)

ATT&CK Technique

System Binary Proxy Execution (T1218), Application Layer Protocol (T1071)

Severity

High

Description

A signed process connected to an external domain that, on a global level, it usually doesn't connect to.

Attacker's Goals

Attackers may use various methods to execute code in the context of a signed process to avoid detection.

Investigative actions

  • Check the destination domain reputation.

  • Check if the actor process loaded a suspicious dll before the alert.

  • Check if the actor process was injected before the alert.

  • Check if the process execution and connections are legitimate.

Globally uncommon root domain from a signed process

Synopsis

Field
Value

ATT&CK Tactic

Stealth (TA0005), Command and Control (TA0011)

ATT&CK Technique

System Binary Proxy Execution (T1218), Application Layer Protocol (T1071)

Severity

Medium

Description

A signed process connected to an external domain that, on a global level, it usually doesn't connect to.

Attacker's Goals

Attackers may use various methods to execute code in the context of a signed process to avoid detection.

Investigative actions

  • Check the destination domain reputation.

  • Check if the actor process loaded a suspicious dll before the alert.

  • Check if the actor process was injected before the alert.

  • Check if the process execution and connections are legitimate.

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