> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://cortex-docs.paloaltonetworks.com/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://cortex-docs.paloaltonetworks.com/analytics-alerts/alerts-by-name/globally-uncommon-root-domain-port-combination-from-a-signed-process.md).

# Globally uncommon root-domain port combination from a signed process

### Synopsis

| Field                | Value                                                                     |
| -------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Activation Period    | 14 Days                                                                   |
| Training Period      | 30 Days                                                                   |
| Test Period          | N/A (single event)                                                        |
| Deduplication Period | 1 Day                                                                     |
| Required Data        | XDR Agent                                                                 |
| Detector Tags        | Global Anomaly Analytics                                                  |
| ATT\&CK Tactic       | Defense Evasion (TA0005), Command and Control (TA0011)                    |
| ATT\&CK Technique    | System Binary Proxy Execution (T1218), Application Layer Protocol (T1071) |
| Severity             | Low                                                                       |

### Description

A signed process connected to an external domain on a specific port that, on a global level, it usually doesn't connect to.

### Attacker's Goals

Attackers may use various methods to execute code in the context of a signed process to avoid detection.

### Investigative actions

* Check the destination domain reputation.
* Check if the actor process loaded a suspicious dll before the alert.
* Check if the actor process was injected before the alert.
* Check if the process execution and connections are legitimate.

### Variations

<details>

<summary>Globally uncommon root-domain port combination from an injected thread in a signed process</summary>

**Synopsis**

| Field             | Value                                                                                                |
| ----------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic    | Defense Evasion (TA0005), Command and Control (TA0011)                                               |
| ATT\&CK Technique | System Binary Proxy Execution (T1218), Application Layer Protocol (T1071), Process Injection (T1055) |
| Severity          | High                                                                                                 |

**Description**

An injected thread in a signed process connected to an external domain on a specific port that, on a global level, it usually doesn't connect to.

**Attacker's Goals**

Attackers may use various methods to execute code in the context of a signed process to avoid detection.

**Investigative actions**

* Check the destination domain reputation.
* Check if the actor process loaded a suspicious dll before the alert.
* Check if the actor process was injected before the alert.
* Check if the process execution and connections are legitimate.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Globally uncommon root-domain port combination from a signed process</summary>

**Synopsis**

| Field             | Value                                                                     |
| ----------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic    | Defense Evasion (TA0005), Command and Control (TA0011)                    |
| ATT\&CK Technique | System Binary Proxy Execution (T1218), Application Layer Protocol (T1071) |
| Severity          | High                                                                      |

**Description**

A signed process connected to an external domain on a specific port that, on a global level, it usually doesn't connect to.

**Attacker's Goals**

Attackers may use various methods to execute code in the context of a signed process to avoid detection.

**Investigative actions**

* Check the destination domain reputation.
* Check if the actor process loaded a suspicious dll before the alert.
* Check if the actor process was injected before the alert.
* Check if the process execution and connections are legitimate.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Globally uncommon root-domain port combination from a signed process</summary>

**Synopsis**

| Field             | Value                                                                     |
| ----------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic    | Defense Evasion (TA0005), Command and Control (TA0011)                    |
| ATT\&CK Technique | System Binary Proxy Execution (T1218), Application Layer Protocol (T1071) |
| Severity          | High                                                                      |

**Description**

A signed process connected to an external domain on a specific port that, on a global level, it usually doesn't connect to.

**Attacker's Goals**

Attackers may use various methods to execute code in the context of a signed process to avoid detection.

**Investigative actions**

* Check the destination domain reputation.
* Check if the actor process loaded a suspicious dll before the alert.
* Check if the actor process was injected before the alert.
* Check if the process execution and connections are legitimate.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Globally uncommon root-domain port combination from a signed process</summary>

**Synopsis**

| Field             | Value                                                                     |
| ----------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic    | Defense Evasion (TA0005), Command and Control (TA0011)                    |
| ATT\&CK Technique | System Binary Proxy Execution (T1218), Application Layer Protocol (T1071) |
| Severity          | Medium                                                                    |

**Description**

A signed process connected to an external domain on a specific port that, on a global level, it usually doesn't connect to.

**Attacker's Goals**

Attackers may use various methods to execute code in the context of a signed process to avoid detection.

**Investigative actions**

* Check the destination domain reputation.
* Check if the actor process loaded a suspicious dll before the alert.
* Check if the actor process was injected before the alert.
* Check if the process execution and connections are legitimate.

</details>


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