> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://cortex-docs.paloaltonetworks.com/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://cortex-docs.paloaltonetworks.com/analytics-alerts/alerts-by-name/information-gathering-via-docker-sock.md).
# Information gathering via docker.sock
### Synopsis
| Field | Value |
| -------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| Activation Period | 14 Days |
| Training Period | 30 Days |
| Test Period | 10 Minutes |
| Deduplication Period | 1 Day |
| Required Data | XDR Agent |
| Detector Tags | Containers |
| ATT\&CK Tactic | Discovery (TA0007) |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Container and Resource Discovery (T1613), System Information Discovery (T1082) |
| Severity | Informational |
### Description
A process inside a container queried the Docker Engine API over the docker.sock Unix socket to enumerate Docker resources (containers, images, networks, secrets, etc.).
### Attacker's Goals
Discover Docker resources (containers, images, networks, secrets) from inside a container to escape to the host, move laterally, or steal secrets.
### Investigative actions
* Verify whether the process and container legitimately require access to docker.sock.
* Inspect the container's mounts to confirm docker.sock is exposed.
* Review the full command-line history of the actor process for follow-on container escape or secret-extraction attempts.
* Look for other containers/hosts executing similar docker.sock probes.
### Variations
Information gathering via docker.sock via a programmatic socket connection
**Synopsis**
| Field | Value |
| ----------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| ATT\&CK Tactic | Discovery (TA0007) |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Container and Resource Discovery (T1613), System Information Discovery (T1082) |
| Severity | Low |
**Description**
A process inside a container opened the Docker Engine API socket directly from code (an AF\_UNIX socket connection, with no command-line socket flag) and used it to enumerate Docker resources. Routine tooling reaches the socket through a documented client flag. Opening it programmatically both hides the socket path from command-line inspection and indicates the caller was purpose-built for this API.
**Attacker's Goals**
Discover Docker resources (containers, images, networks, secrets) from inside a container to escape to the host, move laterally, or steal secrets.
**Investigative actions**
* Verify whether the process and container legitimately require access to docker.sock.
* Inspect the container's mounts to confirm docker.sock is exposed.
* Review the full command-line history of the actor process for follow-on container escape or secret-extraction attempts.
* Look for other containers/hosts executing similar docker.sock probes.
Information gathering via docker.sock using multiple distinct API calls
**Synopsis**
| Field | Value |
| ----------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| ATT\&CK Tactic | Discovery (TA0007) |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Container and Resource Discovery (T1613), System Information Discovery (T1082) |
| Severity | Low |
**Description**
A process inside a container issued several distinct Docker Engine API reconnaissance calls over the docker.sock Unix socket within a short period. Distinct calls are counted after normalization, so repeating one call with a changing container ID does not qualify. Several genuinely different calls in one window is the shape of an enumeration sweep rather than a routine health check.
**Attacker's Goals**
Discover Docker resources (containers, images, networks, secrets) from inside a container to escape to the host, move laterally, or steal secrets.
**Investigative actions**
* Verify whether the process and container legitimately require access to docker.sock.
* Inspect the container's mounts to confirm docker.sock is exposed.
* Review the full command-line history of the actor process for follow-on container escape or secret-extraction attempts.
* Look for other containers/hosts executing similar docker.sock probes.
---
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