> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://cortex-docs.paloaltonetworks.com/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://cortex-docs.paloaltonetworks.com/analytics-alerts/alerts-by-name/okta-user-session-context-change-from-an-uncommon-asn.md).

# Okta User Session Context Change from an Uncommon ASN

### Synopsis

| Field                | Value                                              |
| -------------------- | -------------------------------------------------- |
| Activation Period    | 14 Days                                            |
| Training Period      | 30 Days                                            |
| Test Period          | N/A (single event)                                 |
| Deduplication Period | 1 Day                                              |
| Required Data        | Okta Audit Log                                     |
| Detection Modules    | Identity Threat Module                             |
| Detector Tags        | Okta Audit Analytics                               |
| ATT\&CK Tactic       | Credential Access (TA0006)                         |
| ATT\&CK Technique    | Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates (T1649) |
| Severity             | Low                                                |

### Description

An Okta session context alteration event was observed where the calling IP address maps to an Autonomous System Number (ASN) with no significant historical baseline within the organization over the past 30 days.

### Attacker's Goals

An adversary may reuse hijacked or replayed identity provider session tokens across disparate infrastructure endpoints, which can aid in bypassing location-based access controls and masking anomalous authentication origins while maintaining unauthorized persistent access to the compromised corporate environment.

### Investigative actions

* Determine whether the authentication aligns with an expected user context change, such as traveling personnel, a newly deployed corporate VPN, or an alternate Internet Service Provider (ISP).
* Examine contiguous event streams associated with the same identity or session token to identify indicators of token replay, session hijacking, or impossible-travel anomalies.
* Revoke all concurrent active sessions and force immediate multi-factor re-authentication for the affected identity if the activity cannot be verified as legitimate.

### Variations

<details>

<summary>Okta User Session Context Change from a suspicious IP</summary>

**Synopsis**

| Field             | Value                                              |
| ----------------- | -------------------------------------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic    | Credential Access (TA0006)                         |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates (T1649) |
| Severity          | Medium                                             |

**Description**

An Okta session context alteration event was observed where the calling IP address maps to an Autonomous System Number (ASN) with no significant historical baseline within the organization over the past 30 days.

**Attacker's Goals**

An adversary may reuse hijacked or replayed identity provider session tokens across disparate infrastructure endpoints, which can aid in bypassing location-based access controls and masking anomalous authentication origins while maintaining unauthorized persistent access to the compromised corporate environment.

**Investigative actions**

* Determine whether the authentication aligns with an expected user context change, such as traveling personnel, a newly deployed corporate VPN, or an alternate Internet Service Provider (ISP).
* Examine contiguous event streams associated with the same identity or session token to identify indicators of token replay, session hijacking, or impossible-travel anomalies.
* Revoke all concurrent active sessions and force immediate multi-factor re-authentication for the affected identity if the activity cannot be verified as legitimate.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Okta User Session Context Change from first time seen ASN</summary>

**Synopsis**

| Field             | Value                                              |
| ----------------- | -------------------------------------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic    | Credential Access (TA0006)                         |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates (T1649) |
| Severity          | Medium                                             |

**Description**

An Okta session context alteration event was observed where the calling IP address maps to an Autonomous System Number (ASN) with no significant historical baseline within the organization over the past 30 days.

**Attacker's Goals**

An adversary may reuse hijacked or replayed identity provider session tokens across disparate infrastructure endpoints, which can aid in bypassing location-based access controls and masking anomalous authentication origins while maintaining unauthorized persistent access to the compromised corporate environment.

**Investigative actions**

* Determine whether the authentication aligns with an expected user context change, such as traveling personnel, a newly deployed corporate VPN, or an alternate Internet Service Provider (ISP).
* Examine contiguous event streams associated with the same identity or session token to identify indicators of token replay, session hijacking, or impossible-travel anomalies.
* Revoke all concurrent active sessions and force immediate multi-factor re-authentication for the affected identity if the activity cannot be verified as legitimate.

</details>


---

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