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Possible Impossible Travel Pattern - SSO

Synopsis

Field
Value

Activation Period

14 Days

Training Period

30 Days

Test Period

1 Hour

Deduplication Period

1 Day

Required Data

Requires one of the following data sources: AzureAD OR Azure SignIn Log OR Idira OR Duo OR Okta OR OneLogin OR PingOne

Detection Modules

Identity Analytics

ATT&CK Tactic

Initial Access (TA0001), Resource Development (TA0042)

ATT&CK Technique

Compromise Accounts (T1586), Valid Accounts (T1078)

Severity

Informational

Description

A user logged in from several countries in a short period, including at least one location that is rare for the user or organization. This suspicious activity may be a sign of credential theft.

Attacker's Goals

An attacker who compromises user credentials will leverage those credentials to gain initial access to the corporate network. To obfuscate their true origin, adversaries commonly route traffic through proxies or VPNs across multiple geographic locations.

Investigative actions

  • Review the source IPs and AS organizations. Check if they are associated with known corporate VPNs, cloud hosting providers, or personal VPN services.

  • Examine recent activity associated with the user in the relevant SSO provider, focusing on suspicious actions such as MFA changes or unusual data access.

Variations

Azure First-Seen Device - Impossible Traveler

Synopsis

Field
Value

ATT&CK Tactic

Initial Access (TA0001), Resource Development (TA0042)

ATT&CK Technique

Compromise Accounts (T1586), Valid Accounts (T1078)

Severity

Low

Description

A user logged in from several countries in a short period, including at least one location that is rare for the user or organization. This suspicious activity may be a sign of credential theft.

Attacker's Goals

An attacker who compromises user credentials will leverage those credentials to gain initial access to the corporate network. To obfuscate their true origin, adversaries commonly route traffic through proxies or VPNs across multiple geographic locations.

Investigative actions

  • Review the source IPs and AS organizations. Check if they are associated with known corporate VPNs, cloud hosting providers, or personal VPN services.

  • Examine recent activity associated with the user in the relevant SSO provider, focusing on suspicious actions such as MFA changes or unusual data access.

Rare Country Login - Impossible Traveler (SSO)

Synopsis

Field
Value

ATT&CK Tactic

Initial Access (TA0001), Resource Development (TA0042)

ATT&CK Technique

Compromise Accounts (T1586), Valid Accounts (T1078)

Severity

Low

Description

A user logged in from several countries in a short period, including at least one location that is rare for the user or organization. This suspicious activity may be a sign of credential theft.

Attacker's Goals

An attacker who compromises user credentials will leverage those credentials to gain initial access to the corporate network. To obfuscate their true origin, adversaries commonly route traffic through proxies or VPNs across multiple geographic locations.

Investigative actions

  • Review the source IPs and AS organizations. Check if they are associated with known corporate VPNs, cloud hosting providers, or personal VPN services.

  • Examine recent activity associated with the user in the relevant SSO provider, focusing on suspicious actions such as MFA changes or unusual data access.

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