> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://cortex-docs.paloaltonetworks.com/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://cortex-docs.paloaltonetworks.com/analytics-alerts/alerts-by-name/possible-impossible-travel-pattern-sso.md).
# Possible Impossible Travel Pattern - SSO
### Synopsis
| Field | Value |
| -------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Activation Period | 14 Days |
| Training Period | 30 Days |
| Test Period | 1 Hour |
| Deduplication Period | 1 Day |
| Required Data | Requires one of the following data sources:
AzureAD OR Azure SignIn Log OR Idira OR Duo OR Okta OR OneLogin OR PingOne
|
| Detection Modules | Identity Analytics |
| ATT\&CK Tactic | Initial Access (TA0001), Resource Development (TA0042) |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Compromise Accounts (T1586), Valid Accounts (T1078) |
| Severity | Informational |
### Description
A user logged in from several countries in a short period, including at least one location that is rare for the user or organization. This suspicious activity may be a sign of credential theft.
### Attacker's Goals
An attacker who compromises user credentials will leverage those credentials to gain initial access to the corporate network. To obfuscate their true origin, adversaries commonly route traffic through proxies or VPNs across multiple geographic locations.
### Investigative actions
* Review the source IPs and AS organizations. Check if they are associated with known corporate VPNs, cloud hosting providers, or personal VPN services.
* Examine recent activity associated with the user in the relevant SSO provider, focusing on suspicious actions such as MFA changes or unusual data access.
### Variations
Azure First-Seen Device - Impossible Traveler
**Synopsis**
| Field | Value |
| ----------------- | ------------------------------------------------------ |
| ATT\&CK Tactic | Initial Access (TA0001), Resource Development (TA0042) |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Compromise Accounts (T1586), Valid Accounts (T1078) |
| Severity | Low |
**Description**
A user logged in from several countries in a short period, including at least one location that is rare for the user or organization. This suspicious activity may be a sign of credential theft.
**Attacker's Goals**
An attacker who compromises user credentials will leverage those credentials to gain initial access to the corporate network. To obfuscate their true origin, adversaries commonly route traffic through proxies or VPNs across multiple geographic locations.
**Investigative actions**
* Review the source IPs and AS organizations. Check if they are associated with known corporate VPNs, cloud hosting providers, or personal VPN services.
* Examine recent activity associated with the user in the relevant SSO provider, focusing on suspicious actions such as MFA changes or unusual data access.
Rare Country Login - Impossible Traveler (SSO)
**Synopsis**
| Field | Value |
| ----------------- | ------------------------------------------------------ |
| ATT\&CK Tactic | Initial Access (TA0001), Resource Development (TA0042) |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Compromise Accounts (T1586), Valid Accounts (T1078) |
| Severity | Low |
**Description**
A user logged in from several countries in a short period, including at least one location that is rare for the user or organization. This suspicious activity may be a sign of credential theft.
**Attacker's Goals**
An attacker who compromises user credentials will leverage those credentials to gain initial access to the corporate network. To obfuscate their true origin, adversaries commonly route traffic through proxies or VPNs across multiple geographic locations.
**Investigative actions**
* Review the source IPs and AS organizations. Check if they are associated with known corporate VPNs, cloud hosting providers, or personal VPN services.
* Examine recent activity associated with the user in the relevant SSO provider, focusing on suspicious actions such as MFA changes or unusual data access.
---
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