Possible Privilege Escalation using Delegated MSA account

Synopsis

Field	Value
Activation Period	14 Days
Training Period	30 Days
Test Period	1 Hour
Deduplication Period	1 Day
Required Data	Requires one of the following data sources: Windows Event Collector OR XDR Agent with eXtended Threat Hunting (XTH)
Detection Modules	Identity Analytics
ATT&CK Tactic	Privilege Escalation (TA0004)
ATT&CK Technique	Account Manipulation (T1098)
Severity	Informational

Description

An attacker might abuse dMSA account to escalate its privileges.

Attacker's Goals

Attackers may leverage dMSA account migration process to escalate privileges.

Investigative actions

• Confirm that the user is authorized to create and modify dMSA accounts in the domain.
• Verify the user should have permissions on the OU under which the dMSA account was created.
• Validate that the dMSA account should be created under the OU that appeared in the log (use the GUID).
• Verify that the user superseded an account, with the dMSA account, that should have superseded.
• Check the GUID of the dMSA object to get the account itself (can be viewed also in computer account creation event).
• Check what is the superseded account in the attribute 'msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink' of the dMSA object.
• Investigate the host that initiated the dMSA account migration process for malicious activity.

Variations

Possible Privilege Escalation using Delegated MSA account attempt

Synopsis

Field	Value
ATT&CK Tactic	Privilege Escalation (TA0004)
ATT&CK Technique	Account Manipulation (T1098)
Severity	Medium

Description

An attacker might abuse dMSA account to escalate its privileges.

Attacker's Goals

Attackers may leverage dMSA account migration process to escalate privileges.

Investigative actions

• Confirm that the user is authorized to create and modify dMSA accounts in the domain.
• Verify the user should have permissions on the OU under which the dMSA account was created.
• Validate that the dMSA account should be created under the OU that appeared in the log (use the GUID).
• Verify that the user superseded an account, with the dMSA account, that should have superseded.
• Check the GUID of the dMSA object to get the account itself (can be viewed also in computer account creation event).
• Check what is the superseded account in the attribute 'msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink' of the dMSA object.
• Investigate the host that initiated the dMSA account migration process for malicious activity.