For the complete documentation index, see llms.txt. This page is also available as Markdown.

Single IP accessed mail items of multiple users

Synopsis

Field
Value

Activation Period

14 Days

Training Period

30 Days

Test Period

1 Hour

Deduplication Period

1 Day

Required Data

Office 365 Audit

Detection Modules

Identity Threat Module, Email

Detector Tags

Extortion

ATT&CK Tactic

Collection (TA0009)

ATT&CK Technique

Email Collection: Remote Email Collection (T1114.002)

Severity

Informational

Description

A single caller IP accessed Exchange mail items belonging to multiple distinct users within a short time window. This pattern indicates mailbox harvesting from a shared attacker vantage point (VPS or AiTM box).

Attacker's Goals

An adversary may use a single IP address to access mail items across multiple user accounts, which can aid in the centralized collection and bulk exfiltration of organizational email data.

Investigative actions

  • Pivot on the caller IP across all SaaS audit logs and review every session originated from it.

  • For each impacted user, look for fresh OAuth grants, new inbox rules, MFA enrolment changes and anomalous logins.

  • Check the IP reputation in SPUR/threat-intel and revoke active sessions for the affected users.

Variations

Single IP accessed mail items of multiple users with suspicious characteristics

Synopsis

Field
Value

ATT&CK Tactic

Collection (TA0009)

ATT&CK Technique

Email Collection: Remote Email Collection (T1114.002)

Severity

Low

Description

A single caller IP accessed Exchange mail items belonging to multiple distinct users within a short window, and the IP address contributed additional suspicious characteristics (e.g., unmanaged or risky caller IP, anomalous country or ASN for these users).

Attacker's Goals

An adversary may use a single IP address to access mail items across multiple user accounts, which can aid in the centralized collection and bulk exfiltration of organizational email data.

Investigative actions

  • Pivot on the caller IP across all SaaS audit logs and review every session originated from it.

  • For each impacted user, look for fresh OAuth grants, new inbox rules, MFA enrolment changes and anomalous logins.

  • Check the IP reputation in SPUR/threat-intel and revoke active sessions for the affected users.

Was this helpful?