> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://cortex-docs.paloaltonetworks.com/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://cortex-docs.paloaltonetworks.com/analytics-alerts/alerts-by-name/suspicious-cloud-compute-instance-ssh-keys-modification-attempt.md).
# Suspicious cloud compute instance SSH keys modification attempt
### Synopsis
| Field | Value |
| -------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| Activation Period | 14 Days |
| Training Period | 30 Days |
| Test Period | N/A (single event) |
| Deduplication Period | 5 Days |
| Required Data | Requires one of the following data sources:
AWS Audit Log OR Azure Audit Log OR Gcp Audit Log
|
| Detection Modules | Cloud |
| Detector Tags | Cloud Lateral Movement Analytics |
| ATT\&CK Tactic | Persistence (TA0003), Lateral Movement (TA0008) |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Account Manipulation: SSH Authorized Keys (T1098.004), Remote Services: Cloud Services (T1021.007), Remote Services: Direct Cloud VM Connections (T1021.008) |
| Severity | Informational |
### Description
An identity attempted to modify the SSH keys of a single compute instance. This may indicate an attacker's attempt to maintain persistence on the cloud instance.
### Attacker's Goals
* Maintain persistence on a compromised compute instance.
* Escalate local privileges to gain root on compute instance.
### Investigative actions
* Investigate if SSH keys were modified or added at the instance or project level.
* Investigate which permissions were obtained as a result of the SSH keys modification.
### Variations
Suspicious cloud compute instance SSH keys modification attempt by an identity with high administrative activity
**Synopsis**
| Field | Value |
| ----------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| ATT\&CK Tactic | Persistence (TA0003), Lateral Movement (TA0008) |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Account Manipulation: SSH Authorized Keys (T1098.004), Remote Services: Cloud Services (T1021.007), Remote Services: Direct Cloud VM Connections (T1021.008) |
| Severity | Informational |
**Description**
An identity attempted to modify the SSH keys of a single compute instance. The identity has high administrative activity This may indicate an attacker's attempt to maintain persistence on the cloud instance.
**Attacker's Goals**
* Maintain persistence on a compromised compute instance.
* Escalate local privileges to gain root on compute instance.
**Investigative actions**
* Investigate if SSH keys were modified or added at the instance or project level.
* Investigate which permissions were obtained as a result of the SSH keys modification.
Instance SSH keys were modified for the first time in the cloud provider
**Synopsis**
| Field | Value |
| ----------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| ATT\&CK Tactic | Persistence (TA0003), Lateral Movement (TA0008) |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Account Manipulation: SSH Authorized Keys (T1098.004), Remote Services: Cloud Services (T1021.007), Remote Services: Direct Cloud VM Connections (T1021.008) |
| Severity | High |
**Description**
An identity has modified the SSH keys of an instance for the first time in the cloud provider. This may indicate an attacker's attempt to maintain persistence on the cloud instance.
**Attacker's Goals**
* Maintain persistence on a compromised compute instance.
* Escalate local privileges to gain root on compute instance.
**Investigative actions**
* Investigate if SSH keys were modified or added at the instance or project level.
* Investigate which permissions were obtained as a result of the SSH keys modification.
Suspicious cloud compute instance SSH keys modification by a service account
**Synopsis**
| Field | Value |
| ----------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| ATT\&CK Tactic | Persistence (TA0003), Lateral Movement (TA0008) |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Account Manipulation: SSH Authorized Keys (T1098.004), Remote Services: Cloud Services (T1021.007), Remote Services: Direct Cloud VM Connections (T1021.008) |
| Severity | Medium |
**Description**
A service account has modified the SSH keys of a single compute instance. This may indicate an attacker's attempt to maintain persistence on the cloud instance.
**Attacker's Goals**
* Maintain persistence on a compromised compute instance.
* Escalate local privileges to gain root on compute instance.
**Investigative actions**
* Investigate if SSH keys were modified or added at the instance or project level.
* Investigate which permissions were obtained as a result of the SSH keys modification.
Suspicious cloud compute instance SSH keys modification
**Synopsis**
| Field | Value |
| ----------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| ATT\&CK Tactic | Persistence (TA0003), Lateral Movement (TA0008) |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Account Manipulation: SSH Authorized Keys (T1098.004), Remote Services: Cloud Services (T1021.007), Remote Services: Direct Cloud VM Connections (T1021.008) |
| Severity | Informational |
**Description**
An identity has modified the SSH keys of a single compute instance. This may indicate an attacker's attempt to maintain persistence on the cloud instance.
**Attacker's Goals**
* Maintain persistence on a compromised compute instance.
* Escalate local privileges to gain root on compute instance.
**Investigative actions**
* Investigate if SSH keys were modified or added at the instance or project level.
* Investigate which permissions were obtained as a result of the SSH keys modification.
Suspicious GCP project level metadata modification by a service account
**Synopsis**
| Field | Value |
| ----------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| ATT\&CK Tactic | Persistence (TA0003), Lateral Movement (TA0008) |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Account Manipulation: SSH Authorized Keys (T1098.004), Remote Services: Cloud Services (T1021.007), Remote Services: Direct Cloud VM Connections (T1021.008) |
| Severity | Low |
**Description**
A service account has modified the metadata of the entire instances in the project. This may indicate an attacker's attempt to perform lateral movement within the project.
**Attacker's Goals**
* Maintain persistence on a compromised compute instance.
* Escalate local privileges to gain root on compute instance.
**Investigative actions**
* Investigate if SSH keys were modified or added at the instance or project level.
* Investigate which permissions were obtained as a result of the SSH keys modification.
Suspicious GCP project level metadata modification
**Synopsis**
| Field | Value |
| ----------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| ATT\&CK Tactic | Persistence (TA0003), Lateral Movement (TA0008) |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Account Manipulation: SSH Authorized Keys (T1098.004), Remote Services: Cloud Services (T1021.007), Remote Services: Direct Cloud VM Connections (T1021.008) |
| Severity | Informational |
**Description**
An identity account has modified the metadata of the entire instances in the project. This may indicate an attacker's attempt to perform lateral movement within the project.
**Attacker's Goals**
* Maintain persistence on a compromised compute instance.
* Escalate local privileges to gain root on compute instance.
**Investigative actions**
* Investigate if SSH keys were modified or added at the instance or project level.
* Investigate which permissions were obtained as a result of the SSH keys modification.
Suspicious GCP project level metadata modification attempt
**Synopsis**
| Field | Value |
| ----------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| ATT\&CK Tactic | Persistence (TA0003), Lateral Movement (TA0008) |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Account Manipulation: SSH Authorized Keys (T1098.004), Remote Services: Cloud Services (T1021.007), Remote Services: Direct Cloud VM Connections (T1021.008) |
| Severity | Informational |
**Description**
An identity account has modified the metadata of the entire instances in the project. This may indicate an attacker's attempt to perform lateral movement within the project.
**Attacker's Goals**
* Maintain persistence on a compromised compute instance.
* Escalate local privileges to gain root on compute instance.
**Investigative actions**
* Investigate if SSH keys were modified or added at the instance or project level.
* Investigate which permissions were obtained as a result of the SSH keys modification.
---
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