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Uncommon network connection under an untrusted and newly created causality actor

Synopsis

Field
Value

Activation Period

14 Days

Training Period

30 Days

Test Period

N/A (single event)

Deduplication Period

1 Day

Required Data

XDR Agent

ATT&CK Tactic

Exfiltration (TA0010)

ATT&CK Technique

Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol (T1048)

Severity

Informational

Description

Uncommon network activity was detected from a process running under a newly created and untrusted causality actor. The causality actor is untrusted with a rare hash, and the connection was made to a rare destination. The observed connection pattern is consistent with data exfiltration, command-and-control communication, or covert channel techniques.

Attacker's Goals

The connection pattern observed is consistent with data exfiltration, command-and-control communication, or covert channel techniques an adversary would use to transfer data out of the network.

Investigative actions

Investigate the causality chain to determine whether this network activity is expected. Cross-reference with the originating process, destination IP/hostname, and any related alerts on the host.

Variations

Uncommon network connection from an unsigned process under a newly created and untrusted causality actor

Synopsis

Field
Value

ATT&CK Tactic

Exfiltration (TA0010)

ATT&CK Technique

Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol (T1048)

Severity

Low

Description

Uncommon network activity was detected from a process running under a newly created and untrusted causality actor. The causality actor is untrusted with a rare hash, and the connection was made to a rare destination. The observed connection pattern is consistent with data exfiltration, command-and-control communication, or covert channel techniques.

Attacker's Goals

The connection pattern observed is consistent with data exfiltration, command-and-control communication, or covert channel techniques an adversary would use to transfer data out of the network.

Investigative actions

Investigate the causality chain to determine whether this network activity is expected. Cross-reference with the originating process, destination IP/hostname, and any related alerts on the host.

Uncommon network connection from a LOLBIN under a newly created and untrusted causality actor

Synopsis

Field
Value

ATT&CK Tactic

Exfiltration (TA0010)

ATT&CK Technique

Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol (T1048)

Severity

Low

Description

Uncommon network activity was detected from a process running under a newly created and untrusted causality actor. The causality actor is untrusted with a rare hash, and the connection was made to a rare destination. The observed connection pattern is consistent with data exfiltration, command-and-control communication, or covert channel techniques.

Attacker's Goals

The connection pattern observed is consistent with data exfiltration, command-and-control communication, or covert channel techniques an adversary would use to transfer data out of the network.

Investigative actions

Investigate the causality chain to determine whether this network activity is expected. Cross-reference with the originating process, destination IP/hostname, and any related alerts on the host.

Uncommon network connection from a browser running under a newly created and untrusted causality actor

Synopsis

Field
Value

ATT&CK Tactic

Exfiltration (TA0010)

ATT&CK Technique

Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol (T1048)

Severity

Low

Description

Uncommon network activity was detected from a process running under a newly created and untrusted causality actor. The causality actor is untrusted with a rare hash, and the connection was made to a rare destination. The observed connection pattern is consistent with data exfiltration, command-and-control communication, or covert channel techniques.

Attacker's Goals

The connection pattern observed is consistent with data exfiltration, command-and-control communication, or covert channel techniques an adversary would use to transfer data out of the network.

Investigative actions

Investigate the causality chain to determine whether this network activity is expected. Cross-reference with the originating process, destination IP/hostname, and any related alerts on the host.

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