> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://cortex-docs.paloaltonetworks.com/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://cortex-docs.paloaltonetworks.com/analytics-alerts/alerts-by-name/unsigned-dll-side-loading.md).
# Unsigned DLL Side-Loading
### Synopsis
| Field | Value |
| -------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Activation Period | 14 Days |
| Training Period | 30 Days |
| Test Period | N/A (single event) |
| Deduplication Period | 1 Day |
| Required Data | XDR Agent |
| Detector Tags | DLL Hijacking Analytics |
| ATT\&CK Tactic | Persistence (TA0003), Privilege Escalation (TA0004), Defense Evasion (TA0005) |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Hijack Execution Flow: DLL (T1574.001) |
| Severity | Informational |
### Description
A signed process loaded an unsigned and rare module from the same folder.
### Attacker's Goals
An attacker is attempting to load an untrusted module into a trusted context to avoid detection, gain persistence or to perform privilege escalation.
### Investigative actions
* Investigate the loaded module to verify if it is malicious.
* Investigate if the loading process and the loaded module reside in legitimate locations.
### Variations
DLL Side-Loading of module bearing an invalid Microsoft signature
**Synopsis**
| Field | Value |
| ----------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic | Persistence (TA0003), Privilege Escalation (TA0004), Defense Evasion (TA0005) |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Hijack Execution Flow: DLL (T1574.001) |
| Severity | High |
**Description**
A signed process loaded an unsigned and rare module from the same folder.
**Attacker's Goals**
An attacker is attempting to load an untrusted module into a trusted context to avoid detection, gain persistence or to perform privilege escalation.
**Investigative actions**
* Investigate the loaded module to verify if it is malicious.
* Investigate if the loading process and the loaded module reside in legitimate locations.
Unsigned DLL Side-Loading to a signed microsoft process by a rare causality actor
**Synopsis**
| Field | Value |
| ----------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic | Persistence (TA0003), Privilege Escalation (TA0004), Defense Evasion (TA0005) |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Hijack Execution Flow: DLL (T1574.001) |
| Severity | Medium |
**Description**
A signed process loaded an unsigned and rare module from the same folder.
**Attacker's Goals**
An attacker is attempting to load an untrusted module into a trusted context to avoid detection, gain persistence or to perform privilege escalation.
**Investigative actions**
* Investigate the loaded module to verify if it is malicious.
* Investigate if the loading process and the loaded module reside in legitimate locations.
Unsigned DLL Side-Loading to a signed microsoft process
**Synopsis**
| Field | Value |
| ----------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic | Persistence (TA0003), Privilege Escalation (TA0004), Defense Evasion (TA0005) |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Hijack Execution Flow: DLL (T1574.001) |
| Severity | Low |
**Description**
A signed process loaded an unsigned and rare module from the same folder.
**Attacker's Goals**
An attacker is attempting to load an untrusted module into a trusted context to avoid detection, gain persistence or to perform privilege escalation.
**Investigative actions**
* Investigate the loaded module to verify if it is malicious.
* Investigate if the loading process and the loaded module reside in legitimate locations.
Unsigned DLL Side-Loading - DLL downloaded from an uncommon source
**Synopsis**
| Field | Value |
| ----------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic | Persistence (TA0003), Privilege Escalation (TA0004), Defense Evasion (TA0005) |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Hijack Execution Flow: DLL (T1574.001) |
| Severity | Low |
**Description**
A signed process loaded an unsigned and rare module from the same folder.
**Attacker's Goals**
An attacker is attempting to load an untrusted module into a trusted context to avoid detection, gain persistence or to perform privilege escalation.
**Investigative actions**
* Investigate the loaded module to verify if it is malicious.
* Investigate if the loading process and the loaded module reside in legitimate locations.
Unsigned high entropy DLL Side-Loading by untrusted causality actor
**Synopsis**
| Field | Value |
| ----------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic | Persistence (TA0003), Privilege Escalation (TA0004), Defense Evasion (TA0005) |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Hijack Execution Flow: DLL (T1574.001) |
| Severity | Low |
**Description**
A signed process loaded an unsigned and rare module from the same folder.
**Attacker's Goals**
An attacker is attempting to load an untrusted module into a trusted context to avoid detection, gain persistence or to perform privilege escalation.
**Investigative actions**
* Investigate the loaded module to verify if it is malicious.
* Investigate if the loading process and the loaded module reside in legitimate locations.
Unsigned DLL Side-Loading which was executed by a scheduled task
**Synopsis**
| Field | Value |
| ----------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic | Persistence (TA0003), Privilege Escalation (TA0004), Defense Evasion (TA0005) |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Hijack Execution Flow: DLL (T1574.001) |
| Severity | Low |
**Description**
A signed process loaded an unsigned and rare module from the same folder.
**Attacker's Goals**
An attacker is attempting to load an untrusted module into a trusted context to avoid detection, gain persistence or to perform privilege escalation.
**Investigative actions**
* Investigate the loaded module to verify if it is malicious.
* Investigate if the loading process and the loaded module reside in legitimate locations.
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