> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://cortex-docs.paloaltonetworks.com/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://cortex-docs.paloaltonetworks.com/analytics-alerts/alerts-by-name/unsigned-dll-side-loading.md).

# Unsigned DLL Side-Loading

### Synopsis

| Field                | Value                                  |
| -------------------- | -------------------------------------- |
| Activation Period    | 14 Days                                |
| Training Period      | 30 Days                                |
| Test Period          | N/A (single event)                     |
| Deduplication Period | 1 Day                                  |
| Required Data        | XDR Agent                              |
| Detector Tags        | DLL Hijacking Analytics                |
| ATT\&CK Tactic       | Stealth (TA0005)                       |
| ATT\&CK Technique    | Hijack Execution Flow: DLL (T1574.001) |
| Severity             | Informational                          |

### Description

A signed process loaded an unsigned and rare module from the same folder.

### Attacker's Goals

An attacker is attempting to load an untrusted module into a trusted context to avoid detection, gain persistence or to perform privilege escalation.

### Investigative actions

* Investigate the loaded module to verify if it is malicious.
* Investigate if the loading process and the loaded module reside in legitimate locations.

### Variations

<details>

<summary>DLL Side-Loading of module bearing an invalid Microsoft signature</summary>

**Synopsis**

| Field             | Value                                  |
| ----------------- | -------------------------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic    | Stealth (TA0005)                       |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Hijack Execution Flow: DLL (T1574.001) |
| Severity          | High                                   |

**Description**

A signed process loaded an unsigned and rare module from the same folder.

**Attacker's Goals**

An attacker is attempting to load an untrusted module into a trusted context to avoid detection, gain persistence or to perform privilege escalation.

**Investigative actions**

* Investigate the loaded module to verify if it is malicious.
* Investigate if the loading process and the loaded module reside in legitimate locations.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Unsigned DLL Side-Loading triggered by a rarely-seen remote-management tool</summary>

**Synopsis**

| Field             | Value                                  |
| ----------------- | -------------------------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic    | Stealth (TA0005)                       |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Hijack Execution Flow: DLL (T1574.001) |
| Severity          | Medium                                 |

**Description**

A signed process loaded an unsigned and rare module from the same folder.

**Attacker's Goals**

An attacker is attempting to load an untrusted module into a trusted context to avoid detection, gain persistence or to perform privilege escalation.

**Investigative actions**

* Investigate the loaded module to verify if it is malicious.
* Investigate if the loading process and the loaded module reside in legitimate locations.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Unsigned DLL Side-Loading by a rarely-seen security-vendor-signed process</summary>

**Synopsis**

| Field             | Value                                  |
| ----------------- | -------------------------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic    | Stealth (TA0005)                       |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Hijack Execution Flow: DLL (T1574.001) |
| Severity          | Medium                                 |

**Description**

A signed process loaded an unsigned and rare module from the same folder.

**Attacker's Goals**

An attacker is attempting to load an untrusted module into a trusted context to avoid detection, gain persistence or to perform privilege escalation.

**Investigative actions**

* Investigate the loaded module to verify if it is malicious.
* Investigate if the loading process and the loaded module reside in legitimate locations.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Unsigned DLL Side-Loading of a Windows system DLL name</summary>

**Synopsis**

| Field             | Value                                  |
| ----------------- | -------------------------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic    | Stealth (TA0005)                       |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Hijack Execution Flow: DLL (T1574.001) |
| Severity          | Medium                                 |

**Description**

A signed process loaded an unsigned and rare module from the same folder.

**Attacker's Goals**

An attacker is attempting to load an untrusted module into a trusted context to avoid detection, gain persistence or to perform privilege escalation.

**Investigative actions**

* Investigate the loaded module to verify if it is malicious.
* Investigate if the loading process and the loaded module reside in legitimate locations.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Unsigned DLL Side-Loading of a commonly-abused third-party DLL name</summary>

**Synopsis**

| Field             | Value                                  |
| ----------------- | -------------------------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic    | Stealth (TA0005)                       |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Hijack Execution Flow: DLL (T1574.001) |
| Severity          | Medium                                 |

**Description**

A signed process loaded an unsigned and rare module from the same folder.

**Attacker's Goals**

An attacker is attempting to load an untrusted module into a trusted context to avoid detection, gain persistence or to perform privilege escalation.

**Investigative actions**

* Investigate the loaded module to verify if it is malicious.
* Investigate if the loading process and the loaded module reside in legitimate locations.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Unsigned DLL Side-Loading to a signed Microsoft process by a rare causality actor</summary>

**Synopsis**

| Field             | Value                                  |
| ----------------- | -------------------------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic    | Stealth (TA0005)                       |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Hijack Execution Flow: DLL (T1574.001) |
| Severity          | Medium                                 |

**Description**

A signed process loaded an unsigned and rare module from the same folder.

**Attacker's Goals**

An attacker is attempting to load an untrusted module into a trusted context to avoid detection, gain persistence or to perform privilege escalation.

**Investigative actions**

* Investigate the loaded module to verify if it is malicious.
* Investigate if the loading process and the loaded module reside in legitimate locations.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Unsigned DLL Side-Loading by a locally rare but globally common non-Microsoft process</summary>

**Synopsis**

| Field             | Value                                  |
| ----------------- | -------------------------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic    | Stealth (TA0005)                       |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Hijack Execution Flow: DLL (T1574.001) |
| Severity          | Medium                                 |

**Description**

A signed process loaded an unsigned and rare module from the same folder.

**Attacker's Goals**

An attacker is attempting to load an untrusted module into a trusted context to avoid detection, gain persistence or to perform privilege escalation.

**Investigative actions**

* Investigate the loaded module to verify if it is malicious.
* Investigate if the loading process and the loaded module reside in legitimate locations.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Unsigned DLL Side-Loading by a rarely-seen process masquerading as a known module load</summary>

**Synopsis**

| Field             | Value                                  |
| ----------------- | -------------------------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic    | Stealth (TA0005)                       |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Hijack Execution Flow: DLL (T1574.001) |
| Severity          | Low                                    |

**Description**

A signed process loaded an unsigned and rare module from the same folder.

**Attacker's Goals**

An attacker is attempting to load an untrusted module into a trusted context to avoid detection, gain persistence or to perform privilege escalation.

**Investigative actions**

* Investigate the loaded module to verify if it is malicious.
* Investigate if the loading process and the loaded module reside in legitimate locations.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Unsigned DLL Side-Loading to a signed Microsoft process</summary>

**Synopsis**

| Field             | Value                                  |
| ----------------- | -------------------------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic    | Stealth (TA0005)                       |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Hijack Execution Flow: DLL (T1574.001) |
| Severity          | Low                                    |

**Description**

A signed process loaded an unsigned and rare module from the same folder.

**Attacker's Goals**

An attacker is attempting to load an untrusted module into a trusted context to avoid detection, gain persistence or to perform privilege escalation.

**Investigative actions**

* Investigate the loaded module to verify if it is malicious.
* Investigate if the loading process and the loaded module reside in legitimate locations.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Unsigned DLL Side-Loading - DLL downloaded from an uncommon source</summary>

**Synopsis**

| Field             | Value                                  |
| ----------------- | -------------------------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic    | Stealth (TA0005)                       |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Hijack Execution Flow: DLL (T1574.001) |
| Severity          | Low                                    |

**Description**

A signed process loaded an unsigned and rare module from the same folder.

**Attacker's Goals**

An attacker is attempting to load an untrusted module into a trusted context to avoid detection, gain persistence or to perform privilege escalation.

**Investigative actions**

* Investigate the loaded module to verify if it is malicious.
* Investigate if the loading process and the loaded module reside in legitimate locations.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Unsigned high entropy DLL Side-Loading by untrusted causality actor</summary>

**Synopsis**

| Field             | Value                                  |
| ----------------- | -------------------------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic    | Stealth (TA0005)                       |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Hijack Execution Flow: DLL (T1574.001) |
| Severity          | Low                                    |

**Description**

A signed process loaded an unsigned and rare module from the same folder.

**Attacker's Goals**

An attacker is attempting to load an untrusted module into a trusted context to avoid detection, gain persistence or to perform privilege escalation.

**Investigative actions**

* Investigate the loaded module to verify if it is malicious.
* Investigate if the loading process and the loaded module reside in legitimate locations.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Unsigned DLL Side-Loading which was executed by a scheduled task</summary>

**Synopsis**

| Field             | Value                                  |
| ----------------- | -------------------------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic    | Stealth (TA0005)                       |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Hijack Execution Flow: DLL (T1574.001) |
| Severity          | Low                                    |

**Description**

A signed process loaded an unsigned and rare module from the same folder.

**Attacker's Goals**

An attacker is attempting to load an untrusted module into a trusted context to avoid detection, gain persistence or to perform privilege escalation.

**Investigative actions**

* Investigate the loaded module to verify if it is malicious.
* Investigate if the loading process and the loaded module reside in legitimate locations.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Unsigned DLL Side-Loading by a locally rare but globally common process</summary>

**Synopsis**

| Field             | Value                                  |
| ----------------- | -------------------------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic    | Stealth (TA0005)                       |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Hijack Execution Flow: DLL (T1574.001) |
| Severity          | Low                                    |

**Description**

A signed process loaded an unsigned and rare module from the same folder.

**Attacker's Goals**

An attacker is attempting to load an untrusted module into a trusted context to avoid detection, gain persistence or to perform privilege escalation.

**Investigative actions**

* Investigate the loaded module to verify if it is malicious.
* Investigate if the loading process and the loaded module reside in legitimate locations.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Unsigned DLL Side-Loading from a user-writable folder by a globally rare process path</summary>

**Synopsis**

| Field             | Value                                  |
| ----------------- | -------------------------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic    | Stealth (TA0005)                       |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Hijack Execution Flow: DLL (T1574.001) |
| Severity          | Low                                    |

**Description**

A signed process loaded an unsigned and rare module from the same folder.

**Attacker's Goals**

An attacker is attempting to load an untrusted module into a trusted context to avoid detection, gain persistence or to perform privilege escalation.

**Investigative actions**

* Investigate the loaded module to verify if it is malicious.
* Investigate if the loading process and the loaded module reside in legitimate locations.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Unsigned DLL Side-Loading triggered by a remote causality actor</summary>

**Synopsis**

| Field             | Value                                  |
| ----------------- | -------------------------------------- |
| ATT\&CK Tactic    | Stealth (TA0005)                       |
| ATT\&CK Technique | Hijack Execution Flow: DLL (T1574.001) |
| Severity          | Low                                    |

**Description**

A signed process loaded an unsigned and rare module from the same folder.

**Attacker's Goals**

An attacker is attempting to load an untrusted module into a trusted context to avoid detection, gain persistence or to perform privilege escalation.

**Investigative actions**

* Investigate the loaded module to verify if it is malicious.
* Investigate if the loading process and the loaded module reside in legitimate locations.

</details>


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