Unusual ADFS Remote Synchronization network connections from non-ADFS server

Synopsis

Field	Value
Activation Period	14 Days
Training Period	30 Days
Test Period	N/A (single event)
Deduplication Period	1 Day
Required Data	Requires one of the following data sources: Palo Alto Networks Firewall EAL Logs OR XDR Agent
Detector Tags	Active Directory Federation Services Analytics
ATT&CK Tactic	Credential Access (TA0006), Lateral Movement (TA0008)
ATT&CK Technique	Forge Web Credentials: SAML Tokens (T1606.002), Exploitation of Remote Services (T1210)
Severity	Low

Description

Detected an unauthorized configuration sync request to the ADFS Policy Store from a non-ADFS server, step for forging SAML tokens in a Golden SAML attack.

Attacker's Goals

The attack goal is to forge a valid SAML token to impersonate any user and gain persistent, unauthorized access to cloud resources, effectively bypassing MFA and standard security controls.

Investigative actions

• Correlate this network event with AD FS service account activity. The attacker must use the service account's credentials to authenticate this request.
• Check for a possible DCSync alerts.
• Check alerts that related to ADFS server.
• Check for other correlated alerts on on-premises systems that may be related to the Golden SAML attack.
• Look for signs that the user account is compromised (e.g. abnormal logins, unusual activity).
• Inspect the source machine for the presence of tools like AADInternals or custom SOAP-based scripts.