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User mail items accessed from multiple IPs in the same subnet

Synopsis

Field
Value

Activation Period

14 Days

Training Period

30 Days

Test Period

1 Hour

Deduplication Period

1 Day

Required Data

Office 365 Audit

Detection Modules

Identity Threat Module

Detector Tags

Extortion

ATT&CK Tactic

Collection (TA0009), Command and Control (TA0011)

ATT&CK Technique

Email Collection: Remote Email Collection (T1114.002), Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy (T1090.003)

Severity

Informational

Description

A user's Exchange mailbox was accessed from multiple distinct caller IPs that all reside in the same /16 subnet within a short time window. This pattern is characteristic of VPS abuse and IP rotation designed to evade per-IP velocity controls.

Attacker's Goals

An adversary may access user mail items from multiple IP addresses within the same subnet, which can aid in evading per-IP rate limits and avoiding detection while maintaining persistent access to a compromised mailbox.

Investigative actions

  • Enumerate every caller IP in the subnet that accessed the user's mailbox in the past 24h and check their SPUR/threat-intel reputation.

  • Inspect the user's sessions: look for new OAuth grants, new inbox rules, MFA changes and revoke active sessions.

  • Correlate the subnet/ASN with other tenant users to determine the scope.

Variations

User mail items accessed from rotating IPs in same subnet with anomalous properties

Synopsis

Field
Value

ATT&CK Tactic

Collection (TA0009), Command and Control (TA0011)

ATT&CK Technique

Email Collection: Remote Email Collection (T1114.002), Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy (T1090.003)

Severity

Low

Description

A user's mailbox was accessed from multiple rotating IPs in the same /16 subnet, and at least one IP address contributed additional anomaly signals (e.g., unmanaged or risky caller IP, anomalous country or ASN for this user).

Attacker's Goals

An adversary may access user mail items from multiple IP addresses within the same subnet, which can aid in evading per-IP rate limits and avoiding detection while maintaining persistent access to a compromised mailbox.

Investigative actions

  • Enumerate every caller IP in the subnet that accessed the user's mailbox in the past 24h and check their SPUR/threat-intel reputation.

  • Inspect the user's sessions: look for new OAuth grants, new inbox rules, MFA changes and revoke active sessions.

  • Correlate the subnet/ASN with other tenant users to determine the scope.

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