For the complete documentation index, see llms.txt. This page is also available as Markdown.

Weakly-Encrypted Kerberos TGT Response

Synopsis

Field
Value

Activation Period

14 Days

Training Period

30 Days

Test Period

N/A (single event)

Deduplication Period

1 Day

Required Data

Requires one of the following data sources: Palo Alto Networks Firewall EAL Logs OR XDR Agent

ATT&CK Tactic

Credential Access (TA0006), Persistence (TA0003), Defense Impairment (TA0112)

ATT&CK Technique

Modify Authentication Process: Domain Controller Authentication (T1556.001)

Severity

Informational

Description

A weakly encrypted Kerberos TGT was issued by a domain controller. The encryption type is abnormal for this DC and results in a TGT that is easier to crack. This behavior may indicate a Skeleton Key attack.

Attacker's Goals

Manipulate the domain controller authentication process to bypass standard authentication and gain access to hosts and resources in environments relying on single-factor authentication.

Investigative actions

  • Identify the user or entity that requested the TGT during the alert timeframe.

  • Determine whether a legitimate service or application requested weak Kerberos encryption.

  • Verify whether the domain controller is patched against the Skeleton Key vulnerability (CVE-2016-1567).

Variations

Abnormal Weakly-Encrypted Kerberos TGT Response

Synopsis

Field
Value

ATT&CK Tactic

Credential Access (TA0006), Persistence (TA0003), Defense Impairment (TA0112)

ATT&CK Technique

Modify Authentication Process: Domain Controller Authentication (T1556.001)

Severity

Low

Description

A weakly encrypted Kerberos TGT was issued by a domain controller. The encryption type is abnormal for this DC and results in a TGT that is easier to crack. This behavior may indicate a Skeleton Key attack.

Attacker's Goals

Manipulate the domain controller authentication process to bypass standard authentication and gain access to hosts and resources in environments relying on single-factor authentication.

Investigative actions

  • Identify the user or entity that requested the TGT during the alert timeframe.

  • Determine whether a legitimate service or application requested weak Kerberos encryption.

  • Verify whether the domain controller is patched against the Skeleton Key vulnerability (CVE-2016-1567).

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